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Fiction Reminds Us That Good IS Bad and Bad IS Good
The world you see depends on what you value. When you see a chair, you don't look at the chair per se but at the significance of the chair in relation to what you are trying to do. A chair can be *practical* if you are tired, an *obstacle* if it's blocking your way, or *inspiring* if it is in a museum.
This is evident to some. But what is not apparent is that since there are infinite values from which to see the world, what is right or wrong will depend on the values people choose.
Hume referenced this problem when he said we couldn't derive an ought from an is. You can't tell a person what's right based on a fact—an *is*—because there are unlimited *is's* to choose from. An example from *The Only Realistic Prediction About A.I. and A.G.I.*:
>*Let's say you have to invest $1M in fighting extreme poverty or cancer. Both decisions lead to benefits and suffering. How will you determine which decision is "right"? The answer is you can't.*
The consequence of an unlimited number of facts to judge what's good or bad is that people you deem evil might see themselves as good because the facts they use to evaluate what's right or wrong differ from yours. I could share immediate examples of villains such as Hitler, but I'll instead share one from literature, one from real life, and one from TV. These might be more relatable and provide further depth to my hypothesis than our most known villains could.
For example, Raskolnikov from Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment* believes he's an *extraordinary* person—above ordinary. And as one, he can overstep obstacles, even if it means killing.
Watch him communicate this belief:
>*If the discoveries of Kepler and Newton could not have been made known except by sacrificing the lives of one, a dozen, a hundred, or more men, Newton would have had the right, would indeed have been in duty bound … to eliminate the dozen or the hundred men for the sake of making his discoveries known to the whole of humanity. All great men or even men a little out of the common, that is to say, capable of giving some new word, must from their very nature be criminals— more or less, of course. Otherwise, it's hard for them to get out of the common rut; and to remain in the common rut is what they can't submit to, from their very nature again, and to my mind, they ought not, indeed, to submit to it."*
At one point, someone asks him why he committed a crime, shed blood, and doesn't regret it. He reveals the facts that guide his actions—what he ought to do
>*"\[Blood\] which everyone sheds, which flows and has flowed on earth, like a waterfall, which has been poured out like champagne, and for which they crown people on the Roman Capitoline and designates them benefactors of mankind. I myself wanted to do good for people, and I'd have done hundreds, thousands of good deeds instead of this stupid thing, not even stupid, but simply clumsy, because this idea was not at all as stupid as it seems now, given my failure…By this stupid act, I merely wanted to place myself in an independent position, to take the first step, to acquire the means, and then the whole thing would have been wiped away by relatively immeasurable benefits…But I didn't even succeed in taking the first step because—I'm a pitiful wretch! That's all there is to it! All the same, I won't look at it through your eyes: if I had succeeded, I'd have been crowned, but now I've fallen into a trap!"*
Raskolnikov never thought what he did was immoral. He only regretted not doing what he did more competently.
In 385 B.C.E., Plato highlighted this same problem during a Socratic dialogue—people don't always know they are evil, and how can we judge if they are?
Focus on the figure of Meno, abbreviated as Men, as it represents how many of us would understand the problem:
>*Soc. And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?*
*Men. Certainly.*
*Soc. Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?*
*Men. I think not.*
*Soc. There are some who desire evil?*
*Men. Yes.*
*Soc. Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?*
*Men. Both, I think.*
*Soc. And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?*
*Men. Certainly, I do.*
*Soc. And desire is of possession?*
*Men. Yes, of possession.*
*Soc. And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?*
*Men. There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.*
*Soc. And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?*
*Men. Certainly not.*
*Soc. Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be good they really desire goods?*
*Men. Yes, in that case.*
*Soc. Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them?*
*Men. They must know it.*
*Soc. And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?*
*Men. How can it be otherwise?*
*Soc. But are not the miserable ill-fated?*
*Men. Yes, indeed.*
*Soc. And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?*
*Men. I should say not, Socrates.*
*Soc. But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?*
*Men. That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.*
To finish off with a more modern example, think of Mike Ehrmantraut from Breaking Bad. You don’t have to watch the series to understand the kind of person he embodies.
He's among the most disciplined, level-headed, and loyal characters from a series in which pretty much everyone is a chaotic murderer. Most of us would classify his actions as deviant. But he's "good" under the value structure of what it means to be a hitman—he's not killing, betraying, or exposing his people but only those who oppose them or him.
The following quote gives you a glance at Mike's view on morality:
>*I've known good criminals and bad cops, bad priests, honorable thieves. You can be on one side of the law or the other, but if you make a deal with somebody, you keep your word. You can go home today with your money and never do this again, but you took something that wasn't yours and you sold it for a profit. You are now a criminal. Good one, bad one, that's up to you.*
My premise suggests "good" and "bad" are subjective principles, so we can't say people should or shouldn't do something, as there are infinite facts to justify both sides. **But the question is, should we enforce an irrefutable view of what is acceptable or wrong regardless of this?**
Our decision-makers have answered **yes**. There are rules that civilians must follow to avoid punishment. Politics gave us some, but religion likely had the most impact on us. Many religions set a consensus of morality based on a metaphysical argument that people can't prove or disprove.
The Biblical book of Exodus establishes the following rules:
> *"Thou shalt not murder. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor."*
Some Jewish, Christian, and Catholic people have ignored the rule. But most haven't, and that has, I speculate, led to better outcomes than if the rule was to murder.
The challenge is that "right" or "wrong" *is* subjective, whether good or bad, in most people's eyes. This raises the question of how people can accept a moral code they don't believe in. A friend with a Master's degree in Political Science gave me an example:
>*Imagine there's a social contract—thou shalt not steal. Everyone in society knows it. Yet, someone steals my phone to sell it and feed their family. They violated my right to private property through a "wrongful act." But let's say the person who robbed me is an immigrant running from a dictatorship that took their homes, family, and sexual dignity. How do you expect to impose the moral rules of a social contract on someone like this who has never benefited from it? To someone who has been a victim of acts that the same people who legislatively punish them deem wrong?*
How do you tell someone who has been wronged that they should act a certain way based on facts that didn't apply to them?
You can't. But you can enforce a moral code through the law, a set of *facts*, regardless of whether you *should*.
I believe the basic premise of science poses an answer. We should define a problem, make conjectures about how to solve it, test each, and choose the best one. *Best* usually being the one that most qualified people around the world deem most desirable. For example, the U.S. experiences the most school shootings, a situation most people classify as undesirable. While nobody can tell the U.S. the values they *should* promote, under my premise, for the sake of doing the "most good," they should reconsider their position on gun control.
I want to clarify that following a similar approach to science doesn't solve the problem of having infinite facts, that morality is subjective, and that there might be "better" ways of acting than the ones we have. But it prevents us from getting into an anarchic circle of self-destruction, which most people, I think, would catalog as bad.
I believe, then, that doing bad to good people is an inherent component of a system that's constantly refining (1) what the least problematic set of rules is and (2) how to keep the most amount of people satisfied. As moral homogeneity arises, we can only hope that people who deviate from what most consider "good" or "bad" are easier to differentiate and perhaps correct Raskonikovs, Hitlers, and Mikes before they hurt others.
Whether this *should* be the case is another conversation.
If you can think of other examples, please share them below or directly to my DM (@ MrNicolasForero on Twitter) if you feel more comfortable.
The world you see depends on what you value. When you see a chair, you don't look at the chair per se but at the significance of the chair in relation to what you are trying to do. A chair can be *practical* if you are tired, an *obstacle* if it's blocking your way, or *inspiring* if it is in a museum.
This is evident to some. But what is not apparent is that since there are infinite values from which to see the world, what is right or wrong will depend on the values people choose.
Hume referenced this problem when he said we couldn't derive an ought from an is. You can't tell a person what's right based on a fact—an *is*—because there are unlimited *is's* to choose from. An example from *The Only Realistic Prediction About A.I. and A.G.I.*:
>*Let's say you have to invest $1M in fighting extreme poverty or cancer. Both decisions lead to benefits and suffering. How will you determine which decision is "right"? The answer is you can't.*
The consequence of an unlimited number of facts to judge what's good or bad is that people you deem evil might see themselves as good because the facts they use to evaluate what's right or wrong differ from yours. I could share immediate examples of villains such as Hitler, but I'll instead share one from literature, one from real life, and one from TV. These might be more relatable and provide further depth to my hypothesis than our most known villains could.
For example, Raskolnikov from Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment* believes he's an *extraordinary* person—above ordinary. And as one, he can overstep obstacles, even if it means killing.
Watch him communicate this belief:
>*If the discoveries of Kepler and Newton could not have been made known except by sacrificing the lives of one, a dozen, a hundred, or more men, Newton would have had the right, would indeed have been in duty bound … to eliminate the dozen or the hundred men for the sake of making his discoveries known to the whole of humanity. All great men or even men a little out of the common, that is to say, capable of giving some new word, must from their very nature be criminals— more or less, of course. Otherwise, it's hard for them to get out of the common rut; and to remain in the common rut is what they can't submit to, from their very nature again, and to my mind, they ought not, indeed, to submit to it."*
At one point, someone asks him why he committed a crime, shed blood, and doesn't regret it. He reveals the facts that guide his actions—what he ought to do
>*"\[Blood\] which everyone sheds, which flows and has flowed on earth, like a waterfall, which has been poured out like champagne, and for which they crown people on the Roman Capitoline and designates them benefactors of mankind. I myself wanted to do good for people, and I'd have done hundreds, thousands of good deeds instead of this stupid thing, not even stupid, but simply clumsy, because this idea was not at all as stupid as it seems now, given my failure…By this stupid act, I merely wanted to place myself in an independent position, to take the first step, to acquire the means, and then the whole thing would have been wiped away by relatively immeasurable benefits…But I didn't even succeed in taking the first step because—I'm a pitiful wretch! That's all there is to it! All the same, I won't look at it through your eyes: if I had succeeded, I'd have been crowned, but now I've fallen into a trap!"*
Raskolnikov never thought what he did was immoral. He only regretted not doing what he did more competently.
In 385 B.C.E., Plato highlighted this same problem during a Socratic dialogue—people don't always know they are evil, and how can we judge if they are?
Focus on the figure of Meno, abbreviated as Men, as it represents how many of us would understand the problem:
>*Soc. And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?*
*Men. Certainly.*
*Soc. Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?*
*Men. I think not.*
*Soc. There are some who desire evil?*
*Men. Yes.*
*Soc. Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?*
*Men. Both, I think.*
*Soc. And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?*
*Men. Certainly, I do.*
*Soc. And desire is of possession?*
*Men. Yes, of possession.*
*Soc. And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?*
*Men. There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.*
*Soc. And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?*
*Men. Certainly not.*
*Soc. Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be good they really desire goods?*
*Men. Yes, in that case.*
*Soc. Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them?*
*Men. They must know it.*
*Soc. And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?*
*Men. How can it be otherwise?*
*Soc. But are not the miserable ill-fated?*
*Men. Yes, indeed.*
*Soc. And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?*
*Men. I should say not, Socrates.*
*Soc. But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?*
*Men. That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.*
To finish off with a more modern example, think of Mike Ehrmantraut from Breaking Bad. You don’t have to watch the series to understand the kind of person he embodies.
He's among the most disciplined, level-headed, and loyal characters from a series in which pretty much everyone is a chaotic murderer. Most of us would classify his actions as deviant. But he's "good" under the value structure of what it means to be a hitman—he's not killing, betraying, or exposing his people but only those who oppose them or him.
The following quote gives you a glance at Mike's view on morality:
>*I've known good criminals and bad cops, bad priests, honorable thieves. You can be on one side of the law or the other, but if you make a deal with somebody, you keep your word. You can go home today with your money and never do this again, but you took something that wasn't yours and you sold it for a profit. You are now a criminal. Good one, bad one, that's up to you.*
My premise suggests "good" and "bad" are subjective principles, so we can't say people should or shouldn't do something, as there are infinite facts to justify both sides. **But the question is, should we enforce an irrefutable view of what is acceptable or wrong regardless of this?**
Our decision-makers have answered **yes**. There are rules that civilians must follow to avoid punishment. Politics gave us some, but religion likely had the most impact on us. Many religions set a consensus of morality based on a metaphysical argument that people can't prove or disprove.
The Biblical book of Exodus establishes the following rules:
> *"Thou shalt not murder. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor."*
Some Jewish, Christian, and Catholic people have ignored the rule. But most haven't, and that has, I speculate, led to better outcomes than if the rule was to murder.
The challenge is that "right" or "wrong" *is* subjective, whether good or bad, in most people's eyes. This raises the question of how people can accept a moral code they don't believe in. A friend with a Master's degree in Political Science gave me an example:
>*Imagine there's a social contract—thou shalt not steal. Everyone in society knows it. Yet, someone steals my phone to sell it and feed their family. They violated my right to private property through a "wrongful act." But let's say the person who robbed me is an immigrant running from a dictatorship that took their homes, family, and sexual dignity. How do you expect to impose the moral rules of a social contract on someone like this who has never benefited from it? To someone who has been a victim of acts that the same people who legislatively punish them deem wrong?*
How do you tell someone who has been wronged that they should act a certain way based on facts that didn't apply to them?
You can't. But you can enforce a moral code through the law, a set of *facts*, regardless of whether you *should*.
I believe the basic premise of science poses an answer. We should define a problem, make conjectures about how to solve it, test each, and choose the best one. *Best* usually being the one that most qualified people around the world deem most desirable. For example, the U.S. experiences the most school shootings, a situation most people classify as undesirable. While nobody can tell the U.S. the values they *should* promote, under my premise, for the sake of doing the "most good," they should reconsider their position on gun control.
I want to clarify that following a similar approach to science doesn't solve the problem of having infinite facts, that morality is subjective, and that there might be "better" ways of acting than the ones we have. But it prevents us from getting into an anarchic circle of self-destruction, which most people, I think, would catalog as bad.
I believe, then, that doing bad to good people is an inherent component of a system that's constantly refining (1) what the least problematic set of rules is and (2) how to keep the most amount of people satisfied. As moral homogeneity arises, we can only hope that people who deviate from what most consider "good" or "bad" are easier to differentiate and perhaps correct Raskonikovs, Hitlers, and Mikes before they hurt others.
Whether this *should* be the case is another conversation.
If you can think of other examples, please share them below or directly to my DM (@ MrNicolasForero on Twitter) if you feel more comfortable.
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